system of executive, legislative, and judicial branches. They are still the foundation of the Kuomintang on Formosa. 829

Sun's will exhorting his comrades to attain these and other principles he had worked out was read every Monday morning to the school children and officials throughout China during the ascendancy of the Kuomintang on the Mainland. The short-lived alliance with the Soviet Union, negotiated by Sun after being rebuffed by the West when he sought material and financial aid in building a strong China following World War II[1], has put Sun in the Communist camp as well. His birthday and death are still officially observed and commemorated by the new regime. In his New Democracy, written in 1940, Mao Tse-tung placed himself in line as the heir to, and completer of, the revolutionary work, which the bourgeois Sun Yat-sen had initiated.[35] 668

H. Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei

Just below Sun stood Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei. Both men were eager for power and 665

35. Mao Tse-tung, "China's New Democracy," Sharaf Athar Ali, tr., reproduced in U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Supplement III, Communism in China, Washington, D. C. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949, pp. 67-91, and especially pp. 80-84.

1 [errata: should be World War I.--Analyst]

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critical of Chiang Kai-shek, a native of Chekiang and a relative latecomer to the revolutionary ranks. Though Chiang maintained real power throughout the pre-war period, at times of crisis he was forced by public opinion and the necessity of showing unanimity in the nation to include the names of Hu and Wang in the party and government hierarchy.

Until his death in 1937, Hu represented the right wing in Chinese politics. He had been a revolutionary collaborator with Sun since the founding of the T'ung Meng Hui (Common Alliance) in 1905. Many influential people in China looked on Hu's stand for a strong, orderly, civilian government and the slow extension of democracy as embodying the real will of Sun Yat sen. After 1931, Hu lived in exile and refused to accept a commanding post with the government as a form of protest against its appeasement policy toward Japan.[36]

Wang Ching-wei represented the left wing in Chinese politics and was far more ambitious than Hu. Having been with Sun at his death and conveyed his will to the people, Wang had a

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36. Hu's life and influence must be pieced together from newspaper accounts and isolated references in such works as T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, London, George Routledge and Sons, 1930; MacNair, op. cit., and Linebarger, op. cit.

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strong claim on Sun's mantle. Wang stressed immediate social betterment and democratic procedure. From the time of the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, he had repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to establish a government in opposition to Chiang. As foreign minister from 1931 to 1935, Wang was held responsible for China's failure to resist Japanese encroachment. When the decision was made at Hankow in 1938 to continue the fight against the enemy, Wang urged negotiations with Japan and was forced to flee China with the label of traitor. In May 1940, he returned to Nanking as head of the puppet Chinese government. It was in that capacity that he died in 1943.[37]

I. The Soong Family

The Soong Family, with its roots in Hainan, has represented all sides of the Chinese political spectrum. China's financial wizard was T. V. Soong. As Minister of Finance from 1928 to 1931, and, thereafter, head of the Central Bank of China, he largely determined China's fiscal policies. At the same time, he amassed a personal fortune which enabled him to retire to the United States

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37. See references in preceding footnote and the undocumented generally sympathetic work by Don Bate, Wang Ching-wei, Puppet or Patriot, Chicago, Ralph Fletcher Seymour, 1941.

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when the Communists overran China. The two most famous of his three American-educated sisters are the widow of Sun Yat-sen and the wife of Chiang Kai-shek. Madame Sun opposed Chiang while he was in control on the Mainland, continued to stress the leftist, social-reform side of her husband's program, and now holds high official position in Red China. Madame Chiang is credited with converting her husband to Christianity, tutoring him in the civilian graces, and inspiring and advising him in his conduct of government. She still heads the equivalent of a women's auxiliary of the Kuomintang and continues to be active in social welfare work at her husband's side on Formosa.[38]

F. The Revolutionary Center at Wuhan

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The other great center of both the 1911 and the 1923-27 revolutions was Wuhan, a complex of the three cities of Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow, in Hupeh Province. Wuhan was the collection and trans-shipment center for the rich Yangtze Valley and one of China's first industrial centers based on a modern iron and steel mill at Hanyang. Revolutionary propaganda had made its mark among the city's workers and the imperial

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38. On T. V. Soong, see references in footnote 36. On Madame Sun and Madame Chiang, see Emily Hahn, The Soong Sisters, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1943.

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F. Other Groups

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In addition to the groups discussed, there are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes do have some bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibit intense feelings of patriotism and dedication to the "cause." They work to strengthen the machine which brought them to power, thereby making certain that they will not be deposed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, there have been a few signs of antagonism among the leaders. A purge as violent as that which took place in Russia in the 1930's at present cannot be predicted for China. Overshadowed by the unique personal prestige and cohesive power of Mao Tse-tung, the high-ranking Communist leaders have yet to offer evidence of power-seeking at the risk of disrupting Party harmony and hegemony. This, of course, does not preclude the development discord among Party leaders.

The personnel in lower Party echelons are subject to tremendous pressures from all sides. Even the most devoted Party workers are expected to prove their loyalty to Communism. The fact that the Party relies on close surveillance and an atmosphere of fear in order to keep members in line indicates the existence of dissatisfaction and dissidence within the Party ranks. In Kwangtung

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Province, there are more new members in local Party and Government bureaus. There are possibly more "opportunists" among the new members who joined the Party because they saw a chance for personal advancement. These people are undoubtedly more susceptible to discontent than those who joined the Party before it came to power. On the other hand, the old Party cadres may be provoked to discontent by the rise of new cadres to positions equal to or higher than their own. Generally speaking, cadres assigned to rural areas are less enthusiastic about the regime than those in urban areas who live in more comfortable circumstances and have more frequent opportunities for promotion.

Former Nationalist officials had their darkest days during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when almost all lived under the imminent threat of violence and death. After these intensive campaigns had subsided, a few former Kuomintang personnel remained among the Communist government bureaucrats. There is no doubt that these former Kuomintang personnel are reminded of the necessity of proving their thorough conversion to Communism. A sense of insecurity affects this group more virulently than it does "securely situated" segments of the Chinese population.

G. Conclusion

The Communist system of multiple control, which penetrates all aspects of life, and the Communist effort to maintain a strong tie with Russia are two major causes of dissatisfaction among the

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I. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND ITS AFFILIATED ORGANS

A. Present Status of the Party in the Central-South Region[3]

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Since the Communist seizure of power in the Central-South China region, many Party activities have come above ground and Party policy pronouncements affecting society as a whole receive widespread publicity. At the same time, increasing secrecy surrounds matters relative to Party politics, structure, and personnel.

On the basis of the limited information available, the following points are clear: first, while the regional Party organization has become very flexible, with the aim of performing a greatly expanded function, the tasks are still too numerous for the organization

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3. Information on Communist movements in this region prior to the assumption of power is found in Wang Shou-tao, Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yantze Daily] June 29, 1951, p. 2; Nieh Hung-chün, Ibid., July 15, 1951, p. 3. For World War II Communist activities, see Hsü Tsung-tse, Chung-Kuo Hung-Chün Ti Shih-nien, [Ten Years of the Chinese Red Army], Peking, Hsüan-wen Shu-tien, 1951; K'ang-jih Chan-cheng Shih-ch'i Ti Chung-kuo Jen-min Chieh-fang-chün, [The People's Liberation Army During the War of Resistance Against Japan], Peking Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953.

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to handle; secondly, the Party maintains a concerted drive for increased total membership and adjusts its policies to increase membership. The effect of the purge of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih[4] and the subsequent call for a general retreachment in Party membership is not yet known; thirdly, a thorough indoctrination and training program imposes upon members the duty of continuous rectification and remolding.

B. Party Organization

Three principles governing party organization should be borne in mind: (1) Party organization is an integrated system, a system that symbolizes the extreme centralization of political power and the fullest demand for unity and discipline. (2) Party organization is pyramidal in structure and is erected on a territorial and functional basis. (3) Party organization is flexible. Any attempt to assume it to be a stereotyped organization would be misleading.

Prior to 1955, the organization of the Communist Party of China in the Central-South Region was divided into two parts: (a) the delegates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the region and (b) the local party bodies extending from the provincial party layer down to the hsiang (group of villages) level. Since the abolition of the Central-

4. English text of official statement of the Communist Party of China on the Kang-Jao purge in New China News Agency, London Bulletin, No. 1278, April 7, 1955; that of Hu-Pan expulsion in Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], July 19, 1955, p. 1.

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South China Administrative Committee in 1954, the need for the Party Bureau has diminished. Although the abolition of the bureau organization has not yet been announced, Bureau representatives, with the exception of those from the Shanghai, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang bureaus, were not present at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China held in March 1955 and the 6th Plenary Session[5] (enlarged) of the 7th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 1955. Presumably, the bureau organization in the different regions no longer exists. However, since the Party bureau had long been active in regional politics, and since it can be established at the will of the Central Committee of the Party, some explanation of its operation seems necessary.

Delegates of the Central Committee. The Central-South China Bureau and the South China Sub-Bureau were the delegates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The Central-South China Bureau had direct jurisdiction over the provincial Party organizations in Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Honan provinces; the South China Sub-Bureau held the Party leadership over organizations in Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces. The local Party bodies are divided into tiers from provincial Party organizations to administrative district, county and city, ch'ü [district], and hsiang.

5. Communiques on the Conference and the Plenary Session are found in New China News Agency Daily Bulletin (London), No. 1278, April 7, 1955, p. 4; and Ibid., No. M13, October 18, 1955, pp. 6-7.

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The Central-South China Bureau and the South China Sub-Bureau exerted their authority through two channels, the Bureau Secretariat and the regiona Party Conference. The Bureau Secretariat was, on its level, comparable to the Secretariat of the Centra Committee of the Communist Party of China. Its standing departments were: organization, propagand rural work, urban work, social affairs, united front; its commission dealt with trade unions, youth, and women; it also had offices of policy planning, militar affairs, and other functions. Apart from these standing departments and commissions under the Bureau Secretariat, a more or less independent committee known as the Control Committee was instituted in March 1955, replacing the Discipline Inspection Committee established in 1949.

The regional Party Conference was called immediately after the National Party Conference and that of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the Bureau had not hestiated to use it for the transmission of directives and for periodic controls. In the past few years, the Bureaus convened many enlarged cadre conferences and administrative district-secretariat joint sessions. Bureau departments might also call their own sessions, thereby placing the different Party secretariats directly under their respective jurisdictions.

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C. Local Party Hierarchy [6]

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1. Provincial Party Layer. There are six provincial Party organizations in the Central-South China region. Each is the highest layer of the Party hierarchy within a province. Its first obligation is to enforce the directives and decrees transmitted by the Central Party. As will be seen, the provincial and city/county layers have a mixed party-governmental function while the administrative district and ch'ü layers are concerned more with the Party.

2. Administrative District Party Layer. The Party unit at this layer generally corresponds with that of an administrative district under the jurisdiction of the provincial government. Its great importance derives from the following facts: (a) its major work is Party affairs; (b) owing to administrative requirements, its functionaries are allowed some initiative and independence. For example, it holds authority in the selection and placement of personnel -- Party as well as governmental -- within its jurisdiction.

3. County and City Party Layer. This layer of organization corresponds to the county and city governments. Like the provincial Party agencies, the county and city Party units have the dual tasks of carrying out Party work and of securing complete control over other administrative and mass organizations.

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6. For local Party organizations, consult the Constitution of the Communist Party of China; English text in Liu Shao-ch'i, On the Party, Peking, 1951, pp. 185-90.

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4. Ch'ü Layer. Party bodies are installed below a city or county irrespective of the ch'ü organization. Like the administrative district Party agencies, Ch'ü Party units are directly responsible for the management of party affairs and the implementation of Party policy.

5. Hsiang Layer. It is here that the Party and government fusion is most obvious and the Party control over other administrative and mass organizations most clearly revealed.

In addition to the territorial division of Party organization -- the central delegate to the region and the local Party hierarchy -- there is an organization known as the Party branch or Party cell, which acts as a link between the Party and the masses in all organizations. Party branches are organized in any factory, mine, village, enterprise, street, army, government office, or school, wherever there are three or more Party members. They can be grouped into general branches and Party committees or divided into sub-branches and Party groups, depending largely upon the number of members and the place of function.

D. Organization

In each of these constituent party units, quadripartite division of authority is maintained: the Party Congress, the Party Committee, Control Committee, and the Party Conference.

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1. The Party Congress. The Party Congress of each unit is the highest organization of that unit. In theory, Party congresses at all local levels meet every two years; in fact, the National Party Congress has not convened since 1945, and local Party congresses as such have not been held. But theoretically, in order to carry out its announced function of supervising the Party Committee, the Party Congress hears and approves or disapproves the Committee's report, decides on questions pertaining to that area, and elects members of the Party Committee on its level and delegates to the Party congress at the immediately higher level, subject to the approval of the Party Committee at that higher level.

2. Party Committee. The executive body of the Party unit on each level is the Party Committee, whose power is concentrated. At the provincial level, power within the Party Committee is further centralized in a Standing Committee which has the same permanent and temporary functional departments and working commissions as the Party bureaus. The Party Committee convenes Party conferences between sessions of Party congresses and sets up various subordinate Party organizations, allocates Party personnel and finance, and directs the work of Party agents in non-Party organizations.

Although Party committees in the district and below have no standing committee, power within the committee is further centralized in the hands of secretaries. Certain basic departments and commissions form the backbone of the committee. The

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operational aspect of the Party Committee is uniform at all levels, in the sense that all committees adhere to democratic-centralism and other basic centralized devices characteristic of the Communist Party.

3. Control Committee. The National Party Conference of the Communist Party of China held in March 1955[7] established new Control Committees to replace the Discipline Inspection Committees established in November 1949. The change was made necessary because of the need for an intensified drive toward socialism and as a campaign against corruption and laxity in the Party. Members of the committees are elected by the Party congresses or conferences of the respective levels, subject to the approval of the Party committees of the next higher levels. Local control committees are also subject to the supervision and direction of the higher control committees. They may set up branch offices. Their relationship is centralized and permits no deviation.

4. Party Conference. The Party Conference in fact is an executive meeting. Convened by the Party Committee on a higher level, it is attended by representatives of Party committees on lower levels. Unlike the delegates to the Party congresses who are elected at large, representatives to the conferences are appointed by their own Party committees. The conference has the power to appoint or remove up to

7. English text in New China News Agency Daily Bulletin, No. 1277, April 6, 1955, p. 3.

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one-fourth of the members of the Party committee convening the conference, and to reach decisions on Party work within its jurisdiction.

E. Party Expansion

Since the establishment of the Communist regime in this area, there have been three instances of major membership drives -- the resolution of June 1950, calling for membership expansion in the cities,[8] the 1953 expansion in the cities and counties,[9] and that of March 1955, aiming at the further increase of membership in the rural communities.[10] The purpose of these major drives is twofold: an effort after each major struggle to draw into the Party more loyal activists, and the continuing endeavor of the Party to broaden its organization to include all social groups, particularly the intellectuals, the managers, and the skilled workers.

During the first period of expansion in the city, the main targets were factories, business firms,

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8. Speech of Mao Tse-tung at Third Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, People's Daily, June 6, 1950.

9. Directives of the Central-South China Bureau of June 24, 1942 in Yangtze Daily, p. 1. For a study on this subject see: Fang Shu, Campaign of Party Expansion, Hong Kong Union Research Institute, 1953.

10. Official report of conference, Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], No. 4, April 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

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and government offices. In the factories, progress was not at first encouraging. Sometimes too little was accomplished; at other times, too much was accomplished carelessly. In the First Textile Factory of Wuchang,[11] for example, the Party branch was organized with an underground crew of five. In Changsha, Hunan,[12] the recruitment was also hampered by the weakness of underground Party organizations. Failure here was attributed to an overly cautious attitude and to limited participation.

In other instances the error was over-aggressiveness rather than over-caution. In Wuhan, for example,[13] membership drives were conducted simultaneously with the expansion of trade unions. As of January 1950, some 220 Party branches had been established, 43 per cent of which were organized in government offices and 25 per cent in factories. As of October 1950, some 1,249 new members had been recruited. This rapid expansion resulted in the admission of dangerous elements into the Party in consequence of failure to observe the rules and procedure of admission.

The second large-scale membership drive was ordered by a Central-South China Bureau decree on June 23, 1952, at the conclusion of the Land Reform and Democratic Construction movements and the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, which had

11. Yangtze Daily, Oct. 25, 1950, p. 3.
12. Ibid., Dec. 7, 1950, p. 7.
13. Ibid., Nov. 29, 1950, p. 3.

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removed the remnants of opposition to the Communist regime. The directive urged the shift in Party attention from the country to the city and the recruitment of "activists." In August 1952, it was reported that there were more than 11,000 activists in Hunan Province alone.[14] Within the agencies under the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, the activists numbered 4,613, of which 1,891 were members of the Youth Corps. With the increasing intensity of Party expansion in the cities and the consolidation of political power in the rural areas, the Party membership drive reached its climax in 1953. The total membership of the Party in 1954 reached 6.5 million in the nation as a whole,[15] an increase of 700,000 over that of July 1951 and more than two million over that of June 1950.

F. Party Overhauling.

Party overhauling generally involves four major activities:

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14. Ibid., Aug. 7, 1952, p. 1; also a report from Kiangsi numbered activists at 17,000; cf., Yangtze Daily, Aug. 22, 1952, p. 3.

15. Reported by Liu Shao-chi at the Fourth Session of Central Committee of the Communist Party, People's Daily, Feb. 18, 1954, p. 1. Previous Party membership and compositions in Shih-shih Shouts'e [Current Affairs Handbook], No. 16, Canton May 31, 1951, pp. 14-15.

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(1) rectification,[16] a step which involves examination and the political education of Party members; (2) review and criticism of Party members' work; (3) arousal of mass interest in the criticism of Party members, and (4) increased study. 665

The examination of individual Party members centers upon the eight conditions set forth by the Party and upon the San Ch'a ("three checks" principle). The eight conditions required of a Party member have been set forth in the Party's Constitution. They included the realization on the part of each Party member of the ultimate goal of the Party, devotion to the cause and interest of the Party, and absolute obedience required of each Party member.[17]

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16. Prior to the assumption of power, there had been two rectification movements in Party history, in 1942-44 and in 1947-48. For a study of the 1942-44 rectification, see Boyd Compton, Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44, Seattle, U. of Washington Press, 1952. The 1950 rectification movement was aimed at the promotion of the fighting spirit of the Party and the study of administrative and organizational material. It began in the Central-South Region in July 1950 and lasted until the fall of the same year. Reports of the movement in this region are found in Yangtze Daily, issues of September 5, 10, 12, 27, 1950.

17. For detailed discussion on the eight conditions, consult An Tzu-wen, "Strengthen the Work of Party Reform and Party Expansion on the Foundation of Victory in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns," Current Background, No. 251, July 25, 1953, pp. 5-6.

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The San Ch'a principle is employed by the Party as a means of eliminating undesirable members. San Ch'a can mean a check on work, work style, and ideology; it can also mean a check on ideology, viewpoint, and personal history. During the Land Reform Movement, work style, history, and class status constituted the three checks. This practice may not appear violent, but its psychological effect upon the individual is alarming.

Even the selection of Party members for further training can be used as a means to eliminate undesirables,[18] for it is a device to re-examine the qualifications of Party members; those who fail to pass the examination may be expelled. While rectification and overhauling are constant, the examination given four times a year increases the already high pressure upon Party members.

G. Indoctrination and Training

Another way of maintaining Party unity and discipline is by the constant indoctrination and training

18. Provincial Party Committee of Hupeh's report on land reform, Yangtze Daily, December 27, 1952, p. 1.

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of each member.[19] This practice is aimed at the revitalization of individual adherence to Party doctrine. 665•

The Central-South China region maintains two schools, a cultural school to raise the general level of education, and an ideological school to tighten adherence to doctrine. 665 871

In the country as a whole, one half of the cadres (most of them Party members), have had less than a junior high school education, and some actually illiterate.[20] To remedy this, a cultural school system, administered by the Party and the government, was established in this region in 1951,[21] with the aim of raising the cadre standard to the junior high school level. The course called for two semesters of twenty weeks, with four two-hour evening classes per week. In January 1954 a revised plan was ordered by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, establishing a nation-wide system and bringing both individuals and the responsible secretaries

19. Pamphlets published by the 6th section of Kuomintang on Formosa relative to this subject are of interest: Fe-tang Hsün-lien Ti P'ou-shih [An Analytical Study of Indoctrination of the Communist Party of China], Taipei, 1952; Chung-kung Tang Ti tsu-chih yü K'ung-chih, [Organization and Control of the Communist Party of China], Taipei, 1951.

20. Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the cultural supplementary school system and editorial in People's Daily, Jan. 22, 1954, p. 1.

21. The Central-South China Bureau's directive in Yangtze Daily, May 14, 1951, p. 3.

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below the county and ch'ü levels into the new plan.[22] The plan called for cadre education equivalent to grade school and/or that of junior high school. Also included in the program, and to be completed in three or four months, was a class for the illiterate. Evening schools for the average cadre took twenty weeks at six hours a week to complete. The secretaries and administrative personnel of the Party who were unable to take time off during the day for the supplementary classes would attend school in the evening. 665 871

The purpose of the ideological school is to train Party members, candidates for membership, and leaders of mass organizations. The first group of schools of this type was established in 1951 in such major cities of the Central-South Region as Wuhan in Hupeh, Canton in Kwangtung, and Nanchang in Kiangsi. By 1953, there were sixteen schools with an enrollment of 7,500. The well-publicized Wuhan Marxist Evening School will serve as an example.[23] The school, fully staffed by Party functionaries, reported an enrollment of 543. In addition to the ideological schools, a Party study system in the rural areas was further strengthened in 1955.[24] 665 874

22. People's Daily, January 22, 1954, p. 1.

23. Yangtze Daily, Sept. 1, 1951, p. 3; reports on schools in other cities, ibid., August 19, 1951, p. 3.

24. Central-South China Bureau directive, New China Monthly, No. 4, April 1955, pp. 30-31.

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H. Affiliated Party Organizations

The Party attempts to utilize the enthusiasm of youth through two organizations which, although not a part of the Party, are under its supervision. The New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC) and its subordinate group, the Young Pioneers, for youths aged 9 to 15. The Young Pioneers are subordinates of the Youth Corps, looking to the latter for leadership and guidance.

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1. New Democratic Youth Corps

The Party controls the NDYC through the Central-South China Working Committee of the corps. The Constitution of the corps assures the Party of effective control.[25] It permits Party members to be in charge of corps organs above the county level, thus placing the direction of corps activities in the hands of the Party. The first function of the corps is to provide a reservoir of potential new Party members; for example, corps members constituted 56 per cent of the Party recruitment in Wuhan in 1951.[26] Its second task is to supply needed activists in all organizations, particularly in the factories and rural communities. Its final task is to engage

25. The Chinese text of the Constitution of the NDYC and Li Ch'ang's explanatory report in People's Daily, July 7, 1953, pp. 1, 3. English text in Current Background, No. 258, Sept. 10, 1953.

26. Editorial, Yangtze Daily, Aug. 22, 1951, p. 1.

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in the broadest possible range of activities in order to reach segments of society where Party organizations are lacking.

The organization of the corps follows that of the Party. Prior to 1955, a Central-South China Working Committee of the NDYC was established to serve as the representative of the Central Committee of the NDYC. Local corps organizations on provincial, municipal, and county levels are empowered to establish representative committees in the administrative districts and ch'ü.

With the exception of those working committees on administrative-district and ch'ü levels, the constituent corps organizations rest upon a dual authority. Each level has a congress and a committee elected by it. These committees are the executive organs of the corps and their component members are approved by the upper-level committee. The Central-South China Working Committee has repeatedly stressed centralized leadership within the corps and the strengthening of the position of the corps branches.[27]

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27. For example, consult report of the committee, ibid., August 8, 1952, p. 1.

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The corps branch, like the Party branch, is an essential link with the population as a whole. It may be formed in any factory, mine, enterprise, farm station, village, government agency, company of the armed forces, school, or street where there are three or more corps members. A general corps branch and corps committee can be formed, depending upon the size of the branch. These basic-level agencies of the corps serve to mobilize youth and the masses and also may take over Party functions where Party agencies are inadequate.

The New Democratic Youth Corps has at least three million more members than does the Party itself.[28] However, it is not an organization with political power; it is rather the instrument through which the Party exercises control over youth and, more particularly, over youth organizations in the militia,[29] the army, and the schools.

2. The Young Pioneers.

Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the Corps governs the relationship between the corps and the pioneers.[30] Their regional influence is less apparent than that of the corps. Earlier, the pioneers

28. In the Central-South China area, Corps membership in August 1952 was 900,000, with 50,000 Corps branches established. Cf. summary of the Central-South China Corps Secretaries Meeting in Yangtze Daily, Aug. 8, 1952, p. 1; national figure in Feng Wen-pin's report, ibid., Aug. 8, 1952, p. 1.

29. Corps members constitute 80 per cent of militia in some cases; Yangtze Daily, Nov. 8, 1951, p. 3.

30. Chinese text of Regulations of the Young Pioneers, People's Daily, June 1, 1954, p. 2.

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concentrated upon the promotion of patriotic fervor among the youth between the ages of nine and fifteen; since 1953 emphasis has shifted to recruitment of members.[31] National membership now stands at 70 million, about 15 per cent of the youth in that age group.[32]

II. POLITICAL CONTROLS

The Party has consolidated its power by a network of controls not only over Party agencies but over all bureaucratic, military, public security, and mass organizations. The control is maintained by placing members of the Communist Party of China in key positions in all of these organizations, by reserving all policy-making decisions to the Party, and by agitation to arouse popular enthusiasm in favor of the Party.

A. PARTY CONTROLS OVER GOVERNMENT ORGANS

1. Party and Government Fusion

Control of government organs has been accompolshed primarily by the fusion of government and Party in authority, in functions, in personnel at all levels and in all spheres of political activity.

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31. Official call for the establishment of the Young Pioneers in the Central-South China Area, Yangtze Daily, Dec. 13, 1952, p. 4.

32. Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], March 14, 1955, p. 1.

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The first means of control is the subjecting of all Party members in all government agencies to Party discipline. The directive of November 14, 1950, issued by the Central-South China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, formalized the relationship by requiring all members to report the activities of the government agencies where they were employed.[33]

Another powerful means of control is the placement of Party members in key administrative positions. On the regional level, for example, the vice-chairman of the Central-South China Administrative Committee, Teng Tzu-hui was also second secretary of the Central South China Bureau, and concurrently the political commissioner to the Fourth Field Army of the People's Liberation Army. The several committee chairmen under the regional government were also Party secretaries, thus holding concurrent key positions in both hierarchies.[34]

The pattern of the provincial level is similar. Ch'eng Ch'ien, formerly a Nationalist general, was elected governor of Hunan in 1955, but his Communist

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33. Yangtze Daily, Nov. 14, 1950, p. 3.

34. For example, the Political and Legal Affairs Commission was headed by Li Hsüeh-feng; he was also head of the Organization Department of the Bureau and secretary of the Commission on Trade Unions of the Bureau; cf. Jen-min nien-chien [People's Yearbook], Shanghai, Ta-kung pao, 1950, p.A-41-44; Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], Hankow, Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao-she, 1950, pp. 116-125.

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deputy, Chou Hsiao-chou, the first secretary of Hunan Province, retained true power. In Hupeh, the governor, Liu Tzu-hou was a verteran Party member. In 1950 he was the head of the Department of Organization of the Hupeh Provincial Party Committee and was promoted to first secretary of the Party in 1954.

At lower levels, this fusion is even more frequent.

2. Cadre Utilization

A second method through which the Party exercises control over state organs is the appointment of faithful and capable cadres (Party members as well as non-Party members) to serve in the rank and file of judicial and administrative organizations.[35] Party secretaries in charge of Party personnel are appointed to head the personnel offices of the government organizations. For instance, Ch'ien Ying, then deputy of the Department of Organization of the Party's Central-South China Bureau, was appointed in 1952 as the director of the Department of Personnel under the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, and held, at the same time, the position of chairman of the People's Control Commission in the regional organization. The deputy in the department, Sun Hsi-ch'i, was also a division chief of the

35. For a discussion of the Party's role in the control of state organs, see Hsiung Hsi-yüan, People's Daily, Nov. 18, 1954, p. 3; for definition and the utilization of cadre, see Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Cambridge, M.I.T., 1942, ii.

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Department of Organization of the Central-South China Bureau. 665

After the Constitution was promulgated, all government personnel offices of the central and provincial governments were disbanded. This may mean even firmer Party control of personnel policy.

3. The Department of Supervision and Other Instruments of Control

One of the most common and effective instruments of Party control over government is the Office of Supervision, formerly the People's Control Commission. It is found at all levels from the central government down to the county government. This system of control should be distinguished from the judicial agencies of control, namely, the people's procuratorates, and from the public security agencies.[36] Supervisory offices of all levels and in all organizations are strictly controlled by the Party. As a rule, heads of these offices are either Party secretaries or chiefs of public security agencies. Personnel working in these offices are usually activists, who, like the members of the Party, only carry out Party directives. 665 647

The offices of supervision check the execution of government policies directed against officials guilty of misdemeanors, disobedience, and corruption. Unlike the people's procuratorates, they check only

36. Discussions of judicial and public-security organs will be found in later studies.

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government employees.[37]

The highest supervisory agency in the Central-South Region before 1954 was the Central-South People's Control Commission established in March 1950. Similar offices were organized in the several provinces and in administrative districts in 1950 and 1951.[38]

Control branches have been established in state enterprises,[39] financial and economic offices, transportation agencies, notably railways,[40] and post offices. At the provincial level, such offices are formed within each department and bureau dealing with financial and economic matters. From two to four workers are employed in each branch.

The work of the supervisory offices in the region is co-ordinated with the major yearly drives. The tasks for the nation[41] in 1955 are the elimination of nation-wide waste, corruption, and degeneration within the government.

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37. T'an Cheng-wen's article in "Chien-ch'üan Jen min Chien-ch'a Chih-tu, Kung-ku Kuo-chia Fa-chih", ["Construct a Peoples' Protectorate and Reinforce State Judicial System"], New China Monthly, No. 2, Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 28-29.

38. Summary Reports of the Central-South China Peoples' Control Committee in Yangtze Daily, Sept., 20, 1950, p. 2; August 8, 1951, p. 5; Dec. 5, 1942, p.1.

39. Directive governing establishment, People's Daily, Jan. 6, 1953, p. 1.

40. Directive governing the establishment, ibid., Jan. 6, 1953, p. 1.

41. Official report on the Conference Enlightenment Daily, June 13, 1955, p. 3.

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People's supervision reporters[42] are sent out by the supervisory commission or selected within the organization itself. They are organized into small working groups to spy on the individual worker for evidences of misdemeanor, waste, corruption, bureaucracy, and other behavior not in the "best interest" of the State. Their techniques are varied. They may make direct accusations, establish a network of mass contact, spy on their own colleagues, tamper with the people's complaint boxes, or control the hearings of the "reception room." The complaint boxes are used to encourage accusations and complaints aginst officials and agencies. This arrangement is required in all government offices, and the head of the office is responsible for the examination of these letters, and appropriate replies. The reception room enables people to make accusations and complaints directly to the government. The reception room of the People's Control Commission under the Central-South China Military and Political Committee received 1,615 people and undertook 2,349 cases in a period of six months in 1952.[44] With the subsequent recession of large-scale drives, the number of complaints has doubtless declined.

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42. Directive of the Central-South China People's Control Commission, Yangtze Daily, Aug. 10, 1952, p. 3.

43. Directive of the Central-South China People's Control Commission, ibid., Aug. 26, 1953, p. 1.

44. Ibid., Aug. 10, 1952, p. 3.

made through the consultative conference of the level 666
in question. At the county level or below, where such conferences do not exist, negotiations are carried out by the election committee. There is little doubt that the Communist Party of China commands the selection of candidates in the negotiations. At the hsiang level, a preliminary list of the candidates is given to the electors' discussion group for approval and returned to the election committee. The final list is then published five days before the election.

3. Election Campaign and Fund

The practice of joint nomination of candidates usually eliminates the need for election campaignin . A candidate from other parties and organizations so selected must first meet the approval of the local Party organization; if he is approved, his election is assured. Any campaigning must take place only at the Party meetings and discussion group meetings, where an individual may be questioned and his qualifications discussed. With respect to election expenses, Article 8 of the electoral law permits a disbursement from the national treasury. Since campaigning is rare, the collection of a campaign fund is not provided for. Article 62 singles out bribery as an offense. Other unlawful practices include violence, intimidation, and fraud, offenses subject to fine or imprisonment.

B. Politics of Minor Parties 665 •

After 1950, minor parties gradually established

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in the key cities of the Central-South Region.[75] The offices of the notable minor parties established in this region are the Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang, the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy, the Democratic League, Chinese Peasants Workers' Democratic Party, and Chih Kung Tang.

The Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang, composed of former Kuomintang officials, forms the largest group participating in government. The next largest is the Democratic League. As a party made up of the petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, it serves as a symbol of coalition. The China Association for the Promotion of Democracy is a party of the national bourgeoisie, including industrialists and capitalists. Its services are needed in the nation's economic programs. Minor parties having some political importance are drafted for other activities. Of special importance is the Chih Kung Tang which, as an overseas Chinese political association, has been a major medium through which the Communists seek support from abroad.

The status of minor parties in this region is determined ultimately by their status in the central government -- a status which changed after the promulgation of the Constitution. While the

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75. For example, both the Democratic League and the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy Wuhan branches were organized in September 1950; Yangtze Daily, Sept. 2, 1950, p. 4; ibid., Sept. 16, 1950, p. 4. History of various parties appears in People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 371-80; also A Guide to New China 1953, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, pp. 47-61.

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Constitution still calls for the continued functioning of the Peoples' Democratic United Front led by the Communist Party of China, the democratic groups of the United Front are rapidly losing their identity.

In the first place, the local consultative committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which are the organizational forms of the United Front, are no longer politically important. In 1951 their duties included[76] assisting local governments, reflecting opinion, examining decrees submitted by the government, and participating in government-sponsored drives. Article 18 of the Constitution has reduced their role to that of advisory agencies.[77]

In the second place, minor parties' participation in the government is no longer effective. It is true that minor parties may still participate in government affairs, either through the nomination of candidates to the People's congresses or through the local consultative committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; however, as the foregoing sections have indicated, the peoples' congresses and people's councils fail to provide for true popular participation. Equally significant is the reduction in the establishment of consultative

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76. Decrees governing local consultative committees and the additional functions of the Standing Committee of County People's Conference, see Yangtze Daily, Sept. 8, 1951, p. 4.

77. English text of the Constitution of C.P.P.C.C. in Current Background, No. 309, D c. 25, 1954.

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committees below provincial level. Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution in September 1954, the establishment of these committees in administrative districts, cities, and counties was encouraged. The new Constitution only allows for the establishment of these committees in provinces and in municipalities directly under the central authority. 665

In the third place, with the consolidation of Communist political power at all levels, the position of minor parties is further endangered. For instance, the liquidation of capitalists in the transition stage will certainly reduce the political position of the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy. Eventually, minor parties will no longer exist as a political force in the ordinary sense because they will have no political influence.

1. Control and Infiltration of Minor Parties

The most effective way of eliminating minor parties and their activities is to exercise strict control over them, either through direct subjugation or infiltration. The guiding principles to be observed by all minor parties participating in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference indicates the degree to which these minor parties have subordinated themselves to the Communist Party of China. Minor parties "must assist the state organs and set the social forces in motion...to maintain close contact with the masses...to continue to consolidate and develop the alliance between China and the USSR... and to study Marxist-Leninist theories on a voluntary 665 668

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basis, study state policy, elevate political levels, practice criticism and self-criticism, and strive for ideological remolding." 665• 668

Infiltration is the long-term method of eliminating the minor parties. As early as 1951, Chang Chih-i, head of the United Front department of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, made this policy amply clear in an article calling for the assistance of the Communist Party of China in the expansion of minor parties.[78] He laid down four conditions under which the expansion of policy was to take place. (1) Organization of minor parties must be free from reactionary elements. (2) Expansion must be restricted to key cities and provincial capitals; small cities and counties would not be suitable for establishment of minor parties. (3) A party may not expand to more than twice its former strength. (4) Members of the Communist Party of China taken in by a minor party are not to exceed one-fifth of the total strength of the minor party; their purpose is to render direct assistance to the minor parties on organizational matters.

The fourth condition, if implemented, might result in the gradual extinction of minor parties. Furthermore, branches offices of minor parties can be abolished any time their services are no longer needed. The Chiang-men-Hsin-hui branch of

78. Yangtze Daily, May 10, 1951, p. 1.

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the Democratic League in Kwangtung was totally dissolved because reactionary elements[79] were reported to have been admitted.

2. Minor Parties and "Pressure Politics"

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In a democracy, the political activity of minor or opposition parties may indicate the measure of practicing democracy. Likewise, special interest groups, as such, can enjoy their political privileges under democratic rule. In Communist China, since public opinion is tightly controlled by the Communist Party, and since the minor parties have only assigned duties to perform, special interest groups and the dissident parties exert no "pressure" upon the state organizations dominated by the Party, nor do they take part in the making of decisions.

Deputies of the minor parties were allowed to make speeches at all sessions of the All-People's Conferences, but they limited themselves to praise, criticizing only those minor faults which the Communists themselves had admitted publicly.

Finally, with the retirement of aging leaders, whose authority dates from the pre-Communist period, and with the absence of young and vigorous new members, the value of the minor parties is in rapid decline.

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79. Yangtze Daily, March 7, 1952, p. 3.

COMMUNIST PARTY POLITICAL CONTROL OVER GOVERNMENT LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCHES AT LOCAL LEVELS*



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(continued)

* "Constitution of the People's Republic of China," Current Background, No. 297, October 5, 1954; "Organic Laws of People's Congresses and People's Councils," Current Background, No. 302, November 5, 1954.

Indirectly elected by the congress at the immediate lower level.

x Administrative unit acting as an agent of its immediate superior.

Note: ——→ indicates that members of the council are elected by the congress. ←—— indicates that the Party committee exercises political control over the council.

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because all key officials in the government are members of the Party, and, as such, subject to control by the Party. Complication stems from the fact that there are three groups of control agencies -- the supervisory offices in the administration, the People's Procuratorates, and the public security agencies -- in addition to the control committee of the Party. Consequently, each government department has four control authorities to please. Although each of these control agencies was intended to stress a different aspect of control, the aggregate pressure is felt by the department staff and the employees in government-operated factories, co-operative stores, and other institutions.

The pressure of multiple control manifests itself when the government institutes a new project. In making the assignment, each level of the government has a goal in mind. As the order reaches the bottom of the hierarchy, where the actual work will be performed, the assignment usually becomes far more complex than intended by the original order. Each level of the government exhorts its subordinating levels to fulfill the planned goal, and the bottom level suffers under the accumulation of pressure and tension.

2. Tension within the Party

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The non-partisan in Communist China is subject to government pressure as described, but a Party member has to bear the Party pressure in addition to government pressure. Within the Party, indoctrination of the members is an unending process. Indeed, the demands on a Party member are so great that outsiders hesitate to join the Party. There is some evidence to suggest a decline in Party member-

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ship because of dissatisfactions resulting from this strict control. 665

The Communist Party, of course, does not hesitate to expel its discontented members. The expelled Party members may form a center around which subversive elements may rally. The Communists are apparently aware of this possibility, and are undoubtedly taking steps to ensure against such a development. The exact Communist method of disposing of expelled Party members is not known. An examination of available reports on expulsion of Party members shows that, if accused of definite offenses, the individuals may be tried by the "People's court," as in the cases of Liu Ching, Sung Ying, and I Chi-kuang.[38] Or the undesirable Party members may simply disappear from the public scene, with no more than a brief announcement of the disciplinary action taken against them. Such was the fate of a county Party secretary in Hsü-ch'uan (Kiangsi Province).[39] There is reason to assume that, unless those banished from the Party were imprisoned or put to death, they will represent an influence constantly disturbing to the Party's stability and power.

3. Tension within Mass Organizations

Pressure imposed upon the mass organizations by the government and the Party causes the increase of tension within these organizations. To keep these groups under control, the Party expels the undesirable 668

38. Yangtze Daily, December 15, 1951, p. 1.
39. Ibid., January 9, 1952, p. 1.

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there is any career-pattern which tends to lead to top authority. The largest number of officials have risen to power through administrative or executive specializations; second in number are the military administrators. 647

In detail, we find certain posts which have been held by a significant percentage of the group: chairman of provincial governments (8); vice-chairmen of provincial governments (7); delegate to the First Chinese People's P.C.C. (6); political commissar (5); directors, department of political affairs (4); and member, military control committee (4). We might assume, then, that men now in these positions, or their equivalents, are considered directly in line for future top posts.

An analysis of the present positions held by the top Communist officials reveals much about the techniques for control which have been developed by Communist administrators. The twenty-four men under study hold a total of seventy-five extra-Party positions. When the Party posts are added to this figure, the total becomes ninety-nine, or just under half of the 204 positions originally noted. 647 665

These figures become more meaningful when we determine the percentage of top-level posts, on both a national and regional level, which are filled by Party officials. Seventeen out of eighteen key regional jobs (governor and chairman of provincial governments, Chinese People's P.C.C. Provincial Committee member, and commander of military districts) are Party-held, as are nineteen

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out of twenty-nine top national posts (member of the Standing Committee of the First NPC National Defense Council member, deputy premier and member of the State Council, and National Committee member, Chinese People's P.C.C.) This means that 65 per cent of the key positions on national and regional levels are held by Party officials. 647 665

Superficially, one is impressed by the interrelationship of political and military leadership, with important military men serving also as Party leaders and holding dominant positions in the political administration. But closer scrutiny of the constellation of key incumbencies reveals clearly that the government is, in fact, dominated by the Party and not by military command. The really important military men are Party leaders first and use their military power as an adjunct to Party function.

The provincial distribution of positions among the Communist Party men insures both central and Party authority in sensitive spots throughout the local administrative structure. The four known governors (the governor of Hunan Province is not included among the seventy-nine men under study) are trusted Party men: T'ao Chu of Kwangtung, Shao Shih-p'ing of Kiangsi, Wu Chih-p'u of Honan and Liu Tzu-hou of Hupeh. Communist deputy-governors are also found in five provinces: four in Kwangtung, two in Hunan, and one each in Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Honan provinces. Although there is no known Party official among the deputy-governors in Kwangsi, we find members of the Kwangsi Provincial Committee

of the Party in four other positions: a member of the Provincial People's Government, the commander of the Kwangsi Province Air Defense Command, a Kwangsi Provincial Committee member of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and the commander of the Kwangsi Provincial Military District. Members of the Provincial Committees of the Chinese People's P.C.C. in Hupeh, Kwangtung, and Hunan provinces are ranking Party men, as are officials in the military district commands in Kwangtung and Hupeh. This means that there are at least two, and as many as eight, Party officials in each provincial administration. 647 665.

On the regional level, we find much the same picture. Almost invariably -- and without any exception in the case of the senior Party men -- these Communists were at least members, and more often chairmen or vice-chairmen, on the Central-South China Military and Political Committee (Central-South China M.P.C.) and the Central-South China Administrative Committee (Central-South China A.C.). We also find two commanders of the Central-South China Military District and two 4th Army Field Army officials among this group.

FORMER KUOMINTANG OFFICIALS

A second group of key men -- the former Kuomintang officials -- hold administrative positions just about equal, proportionately, in both quantity and function, to those of the Communists, with the important omission of Communist Party membership. 647